Hawk.E2.80.93dove Chicken (game)

in biological literature, game known hawk–dove. earliest presentation of form of hawk–dove game john maynard smith , george price in paper, logic of animal conflict . traditional payoff matrix hawk–dove game given in figure 3, v value of contested resource, , c cost of escalated fight. (almost always) assumed value of resource less cost of fight, i.e., c > v > 0. if c ≤ v, resulting game not game of chicken instead prisoner s dilemma.

hawk–dove transforming prisoner s dilemma. c becomes smaller v, mixed strategy equilibrium moves pure strategy equilibrium of both players playing hawk (see replicator dynamics).

the exact value of dove vs. dove payoff varies between model formulations. players assumed split payoff equally (v/2 each), other times payoff assumed 0 (since expected payoff war of attrition game, presumed models contest decided display duration).

while hawk–dove game typically taught , discussed payoffs in terms of v , c, solutions hold true matrix payoffs in figure 4, w > t > l > x.

hawk–dove variants

biologists have explored modified versions of classic hawk–dove game investigate number of biologically relevant factors. these include adding variation in resource holding potential, , differences in value of winning different players, allowing players threaten each other before choosing moves in game, , extending interaction 2 plays of game.

pre-commitment

one tactic in game 1 party signal intentions convincingly before game begins. example, if 1 party ostentatiously disable steering wheel before match, other party compelled swerve. shows that, in circumstances, reducing 1 s own options can strategy. 1 real-world example protester handcuffs himself object, no threat can made compel him move (since cannot move). example, taken fiction, found in stanley kubrick s dr. strangelove. in film, russians sought deter american attack building doomsday machine, device trigger world annihilation if russia hit nuclear weapons or if attempt made disarm it. however, russians had planned signal deployment of machine few days after having set up, which, because of unfortunate course of events, turned out late.

players may make non-binding threats not swerve. has been modeled explicitly in hawk–dove game. such threats work, must wastefully costly if threat 1 of 2 possible signals ( not swerve / swerve ), or costless if there 3 or more signals (in case signals function game of rock, paper, scissors ).